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Abstract
The rapid growth of deep learning applications in real life
is accompanied by severe safety concerns. To mitigate this
uneasy phenomenon, much research has been done providing
reliable evaluations of the fragility level in different deep neu-
ral networks. Apart from devising adversarial attacks, quanti-
fiers that certify safeguarded regions have also been designed
in the past five years. The summarizing work of Salman et al.
unifies a family of existing verifiers under a convex relaxation
framework. We draw inspiration from such work and further
demonstrate the optimality of deterministic CROWN (Zhang
et al. 2018) solutions in a given linear programming problem
under mild constraints. Given this theoretical result, the com-
putationally expensive linear programming based method is
shown to be unnecessary. We then propose an optimization-
based approach FROWN (Fastened CROWN): a general al-
gorithm to tighten robustness certificates for neural networks.
Extensive experiments on various networks trained individ-
ually verify the effectiveness of FROWN in safeguarding
larger robust regions.
Introduction
The vulnerability of deep neural networks remains an un-
revealed snare in the beginning years of the deep learn-
ing resurgence. In 2014, Szegedy et al. uncovered the dis-
covery of hardly-perceptible adversarial perturbations that
could fool image classifiers. This discovery agonized the fast
development of accuracy-oriented deep learning and shifted
community’s attentions to the fragility of trained models. Es-
pecially with the increasing adoption of machine learning
and artificial intelligence in safety-critical applications, the
vulnerability of machine learning models to adversarial at-
tacks has become a vital issue (Sharif et al. 2016; Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017; Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Wong and Kolter 2018). Addressing this urging issue re-
quires reliable ways to evaluate the robustness of a neural
network, namely by studying the safety region around a data
point where no adversarial example exists. This understand-
ing of machine learning models’ vulnerability will, on the
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other hand, help industries build more robust intelligent sys-
tems.
Disparate ways of reasoning and quantifying vulnerabil-
ity (or robustness) of neural networks have been exploited
to approach this dilemma, among which attack-based meth-
ods have long been in a dominating position. In these years,
a sequel of adversarial attack algorithms have been pro-
posed to mislead networks’ predictions in tasks such as
object detection (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016), visual ques-
tion answering (Mudrakarta et al. 2018; Zeng et al. 2019;
Gao et al. 2019b; Gao et al. 2019a), text classification (Pa-
pernot et al. 2016), speech recognition (Cisse et al. 2017;
Gong and Poellabauer 2017), and audio systems (Carlini
and Wagner 2018), where the level of model vulnerability is
quantified by the distortion between successful adversaries
and the original data points. Notably, the magnitudes of dis-
tortions suggested by attack-based methods are essentially
upper bounds of the minimum adversarial distortion.
In contrast to attack-based approaches, attack-agnostic
verification-based methods evaluate the level of network
vulnerability by either directly estimating (Szegedy et al.
2014; Weng et al. 2018b) or lower bounding (Hein and
Andriushchenko 2017; Raghunathan, Steinhardt, and Liang
2018; Dvijotham et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018; Singh et al.
2018; Weng et al. 2019) the minimum distortion networks
can bear for a specific input sample. As an iconic robustness
estimation, CLEVER (Weng et al. 2018a) converts the ro-
bustness evaluation task into the estimation of the local Lip-
schitz constant, which essentially associates with the max-
imum norm of the local gradients w.r.t. the original exam-
ple. Extensions of CLEVER (Weng et al. 2018c) focuses on
twice differentiable classifiers and works on first-order Tay-
lor polynomial with Lagrange remainder.
A number of verification-based methods have been pro-
posed in literature to compute a lower bound of the safe-
guarded region around a given input, i.e. a region where
the network is guaranteed to make consistent predictions de-
spite any input perturbations. A pioneering work in provid-
ing certifiable robustness verification (Szegedy et al. 2014)
computes the product of weight matrix operator norms in
ReLU networks to give a lower-bounding metric of the
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Table 1: List of Notations
Notation Definition Notation Definition Notation Definition
F : Rn → Rt neural network classifier x0 ∈ Rn original input x ∈ Rn perturbed input
n input size a(k) the hidden state of the k-th layer z(k) the pre-activation of the k-th layer
nk number of neurons in layer k [K] set {1, 2, · · · ,K} Bp(x0, ) {x | ‖x− x0‖p ≤ }
FLj (x) : Rn → R linear lower bound of Fj(x) γ(k)Lj global lower bound of z(k)j l 4 z 4 u lr ≤ zr ≤ ur,
FUj (x) : Rn → R linear upper bound of Fj(x) γ(k)Uj global upper bound of z(k)j ∀ r ∈ [s], l, z,u ∈ Rs
s[k−1]U set {s(1)U , . . . , s(k−1)U} t[k−1]U set {t(1)U , . . . , t(k−1)U}
neg(x) =
x, if x ≤ 0;
s[k−1]L set {s(1)L, . . . , s(k−1)L} t[k−1]L set {t(1)L, . . . , t(k−1)L} 0, otherwise.
a[k] set {a(1), ,a(2), ...,a(k)} z[k] set {z(1), , z(2), ..., z(k)} σ ReLU/ Sigmoid/ Tanh activation
minimum distortion. However, this certificate method was
shown to be generally too conservative to be useful (Hein
and Andriushchenko 2017; Weng et al. 2018b). Later,
tighter bounds have also been provided for continuously-
differentiable shallow networks by utilizing local Lipschitz
constants of the network (Hein and Andriushchenko 2017).
Then, for the first time, the formal verification problem is
reduced from a mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
problem to a linear programming (LP) problem when deal-
ing with l∞-norm box constraints (Wong and Kolter 2018).
Its concurrent works include Fast-Lin (Weng et al. 2018b),
which analytically calculates bounds for perturbed sam-
ples in given regions and finds the largest certifiable re-
gion for ReLU networks through binary search. Fast-Lin is
further generalized for multilayer perceptrons with general
activation functions in CROWN (Zhang et al. 2018). Re-
cently, Salman et al. conclude a general framework for a
genre of convex relaxed optimization problems and demon-
strate existing approaches to be special cases of their pro-
posal. Notably, although Wong and Kolter propose to verify
the robustness for ReLU network by the use of LP, a feasible
dual solution is instead used in practice to avoid any actual
use of LP solvers. Comparatively, Salman et al. experiment
with more than one linear function to bound nonlinear acti-
vations (e.g. 2 lower-bounding functions for ReLU act.) and
stick to LP solvers.
Certifiable robustness lower bounds are especially vital in
safety-critical scenarios (e.g. autonomous driving car) since
any miss-classification can be lethal. However, albeit be-
ing useful, new challenges with these certifiable quantifiers
arise. There are, in most cases, non-negligible gaps between
the certified lower and upper bounds of the minimum distor-
tion. This inconsistency in the quantification questions di-
minishes the use of these state-of-the-art robustness evalua-
tion approaches.
In this article, we stay in line with the previous sequel of
works that focus on linear bounds and provide two major
contributions:
1. We prove that if we limit the constraint relaxation to be
exactly one linear bound in each direction (upper and
lower) in the LP-based method, the results provided by
CROWN are optimal. Therefore the costly LP solving
process is unnecessary under this relaxation.
2. We propose a general optimization framework that we
name FROWN (Fastened CROWN) for tightening the
certifiable regions guaranteed by CROWN, which is also
theoretically applicable to tighten convolutional neural
network certificate CNN-Cert (Boopathy et al. 2019) and
recurrent neural network certificate POPQORN (Ko et al.
2019).
Backgrounds
This section summarizes the most relevant backgrounds of
our proposals. Specifically, LP formulation (Salman et al.
2019) is summarized, together with the seminal work of
Fast-Lin (Weng et al. 2018b) and CROWN (Zhang et al.
2018) (generalized Fast-Lin). We first begin by giving the
definition of an m-layer neural network:
Definitions. Given a trainedm-layer perceptron F , we de-
note the hidden unit, weight matrix, bias, and pre-activation
unit of the k-th layer (k ∈ [m]) as a(k),W(k), b(k), and z(k),
respectively. Hence, z(k) = W(k)a(k−1) + b(k), a(k) =
σ(z(k)), where a0 = x0 ∈ Rn is the original input
and F (x) = z(m) is the network output. Denoting the
number of neurons as nk for the k-th layer, implies that
a(k), z(k),b(k) ∈ Rnk and W(k) ∈ Rnk×nk−1 , for k ∈ [m].
Furthermore, we use square brackets in the superscripts to
group a set of variables (e.g. a[m] denotes the set of variables
{a(1), ,a(2), ...,a(m)} and z[m] denotes the set of variables
{z(1), , z(2), ..., z(m)}). Table 1 summarizes all the notations
we use in this paper.
When quantifying the robustness of the m-layer neural
network, one essentially wants to know 1) how far the net-
work output will deviate when the input is perturbed with
distortions of a certain magnitude and 2) the critical point in
terms of distortion magnitudes, beyond which the deviation
might alter the model prediction. If we let x ∈ Rn denote
the perturbed input of x0 (class i) within an -bounded lp-
ball (i.e., x ∈ Bp(x0, ), or‖x− x0‖p ≤ ), the task of ro-
bustness analysis for this network intrinsically involves the
comparison between the i-th network output Fi(x) and other
outputs Fj 6=i(x). In practice, one can translate the original
problem to the problem of deriving a lower bound of Fi(x)
and upper bounds of Fj 6=i(x) for perturbed inputs within the
lp-norm ball. With such quantifier, network F is guaranteed
to make consistent predictions within the lp-norm ball if the
lower bound of the original class output is always larger than
the upper bounds of all other classes’ outputs.
We summarize below the LP problem (Salman et al. 2019)
to solve the lower bound of Fi(x). The LP problem for the
upper bound of Fj 6=i(x) can be similarly derived.
The LP problem. The optimization problem for solving
the lower bound of Fi(x) = z
(m)
i = W
(m)
i,: a
(m−1) + b(m)i
reads:
min
a(0)∈Bp(x0,),a[m−1],z[m−1]
W
(m)
i,: a
(m−1) + b(m)i (1)
s.t.
{
z(k) =W(k)a(k−1) + b(k),∀ k ∈ [m− 1],
a(k) = σ(z(k)),∀ k ∈ [m− 1].
The optimization problem for upper bounds can be read-
ily obtained by replacing the “min” operation by “max”.
Then, the nonlinear constraint in (1) is lifted with linear re-
laxations. Specifically, suppose the lower and upper bounds
of the pre-activation units z[m−1] are known, namely, for k
from 1 to m− 1, as a result l(k) and u(k) satisfy
l(k) 4 z(k) 4 u(k), (2)
and therefore every element σ(z(k)i ) of the nonlinear acti-
vation σ(z(k)) in constraint (1) can be bounded by linear
functions:
h
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ) ≤ σ(z(k)i ) ≤ h(k)Ui (z(k)i ),∀z(k)i ∈ [l(k)i ,u(k)i ],
(3)
for i ∈ [nk]. The existence of linear bounding func-
tions in (3) is guaranteed since z(k)i is bounded and
compactness is a continuous invariant within any inter-
val. For example, the following are bounding functions:
h
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ) = minz(k)i ∈[l(k)i ,u(k)i ]
(σ(z
(k)
i )), h
(k)U
i (z
(k)
i ) =
max
z
(k)
i ∈[l(k)i ,u(k)i ]
(σ(z
(k)
i )). h
(k)L
i and h
(k)U
i can also be
taken as the pointwise supremum and infimum of several
linear functions, respectively, which is equivalent to using
multiple linear constraints. In practice, Salman et al. use lin-
ear functions characterized by slopes and intercepts:
h
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ) = s
(k)L
i z
(k)
i + t
(k)L
i ,
h
(k)U
i (z
(k)
i ) = s
(k)U
i z
(k)
i + t
(k)U
i . (4)
The optimization problem can therefore be relaxed to an LP-
alike problem1:
min
a(0)∈Bp(x0,),a[m−1],z[m−1]
W
(m)
i,: a
(m−1) + b(m)i (5)
s.t.

z(k) =W(k)a(k−1) + b(k),∀ k ∈ [m− 1],
h(k)L(z(k)) 4 a(k) 4 h(k)U (z(k)),∀ k ∈ [m− 1],
l(k) 4 zk 4 u(k),∀ k ∈ [m− 1].
Recalling that with the optimization formed as in Prob-
lem (5), one is essentially optimizing for the lower (or upper)
output bounds of the network (the pre-activation of the m-th
1The optimization problem turns to a strict LP problem only
when we have p = ∞ or 1 that makes the feasible set a polyhe-
dron. However we coarsely denote all the cases in general as LP
problems since all the constraints are now linear in the variables.
layer), whereas these build upon the assumption that the pre-
activation bounds are known as Equation (2). To satisfy this
assumption, one actually only needs to substitute the layer
index m in Problem (5) with the corresponding intermedi-
ate layer’s index. In practice, one can recursively solve LP
problems from the second layer to the m-th layer to obtain
the pre-activation bounds for all layers. In this process, the
pre-activation bounds computed in a layer also constitute the
optimization constraint for the next to-be-solved optimiza-
tion problem for the next layer’s pre-activation. See details
of this LP-based method in Appendix Section A.3.
CROWN Solutions. Here we briefly walk through
the derivation of Fast-Lin (Weng et al. 2018b) and
CROWN (Zhang et al. 2018), whose procedures are essen-
tially the same except for activation-specific bounding rules
adopted. The first steps include bounding z(k)i , k ∈ [m] 2.
z
(k)
i =
nk−1∑
j=1
W
(k)
i,j σ(z
(k−1)
j ) + b
(k)
i , (6)
≥
nk−2∑
j=1
W˜
(k−1)
i,j σ(z
(k−2)
j ) + b˜
(k−1)
i , (7)
where neg(x) = x, if x ≤ 0; neg(x) = 0, otherwise. And
W˜
(k−1)
i,j = [relu(W
(k)
i,: )  (s(k−1)L)> + neg(W(k)i,: ) 
(s(k−1)U )>]W(k−1):,j , b˜
(k−1)
i = [relu(W
(k)
i,: ) 
(s(k−1)L)> + neg(W(k)i,: )  (s(k−1)U )>]b(k−1) +
relu(W
(k)
i,: )t
(k−1)L + neg(W(k)i,: )t
(k−1)U + b(k)i , where denotes element-wise products. As Equations (6) and (7)
are in similar forms, the above procedures can be repeated
until all the nonlinearities in k − 1 layers are unwrapped
by linear bounding functions and z(k)i is upper bounded by∑n
j=1 W˜
(1)
i,j xj + b˜
(1)
i , where W˜
(1)
i,j and b˜
(1)
i are similarly
defined as shown above. Taking the dual form of the bound
then yields the closed-form bound γLj that satisfies
z
(k)
i ≥ γ(k)Li :=W˜(1)i,: x0 − ‖W˜(1)i,: ‖q + b˜(1)i , (8)
∀ x ∈ Bp(x0, ), where 1/p + 1/q = 1. Although the
steps above are used to derive the closed-form lower bound,
the closed-form upper bound γ(k)Ui can be similarly de-
rived. To quantify the robustness for an m-layer neural net-
work, one needs to recursively adopt formulas in Equa-
tion (8) to calculate the bounds of pre-activation3 z(k),
for k = 2, . . . ,m. These bounds, as will be explained
in more details later, confine the feasible set for choosing
bounding linear functions in Equation (4). Notably, lower
bound γ(k)Li and upper bound γ
(k)U
i are implicitly reliant
to slopes of bounding lines in previous layers s[k−1]U =
2Similar to the discussion in the LP-based method above, the
bounds computed are exactly network output bounds when k =
m; whereas k 6= m gives the pre-activation bounds to fulfill the
assumption in Inequality (2).
3z(1) is deterministically computed by the input and z(m) =
F (x) is the output bound.
{s(1)U , . . . , s(k−1)U}, s[k−1]L = {s(1)L, . . . , s(k−1)L} and
their intercepts t[k−1]U = {t(1)U , . . . , t(k−1)U}, t[k−1]L =
{t(1)L, . . . , t(k−1)L}. A major difference that distinguishes
CROWN from our contributions in the following sections
is its deterministic rules of choosing upper/lower-bounding
lines. The readers are referred to the literature (Zhang et al.
2018) or Sections A.2 and A.4 in the appendix for more de-
tails of CROWN.
Relation Between the LP Problem and
CROWN Solutions
Now we discuss the relationship between the LP prob-
lem formulation and CROWN. A key conclusion is that:
CROWN is not only a dual feasible solution of the presented
LP problem as discussed by Salman et al., it gives the opti-
mal solution under mild constraints.
Before introducing the optimality of CROWN solutions
under the LP framework, we define an important condition
in the computation process of CROWN as below:
Condition 1 Self-consistency. Suppose {s˜[v−1]U , s˜[v−1]L,
t˜[v−1]U , t˜[v−1]L} are used to calculate γ(v)Li and γ(v)Ui ,
{sˆ[k−1]U , sˆ[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L} are used to calculate
γ
(k)L
j and γ
(k)U
j , then the following condition holds,
s˜[v−1]U = sˆ[v−1]U , s˜[v−1]L = sˆ[v−1]L,
t˜[v−1]U = tˆ[v−1]U , t˜[v−1]L = tˆ[v−1]L,
for ∀ i ∈ [nv],∀j ∈ [nk], 2 ≤ v ≤ k ≤ m and two sets
equal to each other is defined as their corresponding ele-
ments equal to each other.
A similar condition can also be defined in the LP-based
method and is supplemented in Section A.3 in the appendix.
The self-consistency condition guarantees the same set of
bounding lines is used when computing bounds for different
neurons in the process of CROWN or the LP-based method.
We note that both the original CROWN and the LP-based
method satisfy the self-consistency condition.
Theorem 1 The lower bound obtained by Equation (8) is
the optimal solution to Problem (5) when the following three
conditions are met:
• Each of the h(k)L(zk) and h(k)U (zk) in Problem (5) is
chosen to be one linear function4 as in Equation (4).
• The LP problem shares the same bounding lines with
CROWN.
• The self-consistency conditions for both CROWN and the
LP-based method hold.
We refer readers to Section A.5 in the appendix for the proof.
We emphasize the cruciality of the self-consistency condi-
tions in Theorem 1: We do observe CROWN and the LP-
based method can give different bounds when Condition 1 is
not met, even though the two use the same bounding lines. In
essence, Theorem 1 allows one to compute bounds analyti-
cally and efficiently following steps in CROWN instead of
solving the expensive LP problems under certain conditions.
4Theoretically one can use multiple linear functions to bound
the nonlinearity in Problem (5) to obtain tighter bounds.
Figure 1: The process of CROWN using different bounding
lines to compute the closed-form bounds for different neu-
rons. The blue curves are the ReLU activation. The orange
and green lines are the upper and lower bounding lines, re-
spectively. When computing closed-form bounds of the pre-
activation of neurons in the second layer, different neurons
can choose different bounding lines in the previous layers to
yield the tightest closed-form bounds for themselves.
Fastened CROWN
Recognizing the dependency of lower bounds and upper
bounds to slopes and intercepts in the original CROWN
method, a consistent use of these parameters is enforced
through the self-consistency condition. In fact, we argue
that this constraint can be lifted in general (we visualize
this relaxation in Figure 1). The aim of this section stems
from this relaxation and focuses on optimizing the pre-
activation/output bounds over these tunable bounding pa-
rameters to achieve tighter bounds. In that merit, we pro-
pose an optimization framework called FROWN (Fastened
CROWN) for tightening robustness certificates in CROWN.
Moreover, FROWN is versatile and can be widely ap-
plied to tighten previously-proposed CNN-Cert (Boopa-
thy et al. 2019) for convolutional neural networks and
POPQORN (Ko et al. 2019) for recurrent neural networks.
We formalize the objective as the following two optimiza-
tion problems:
max
s[k−1]L,s[k−1]U ,t[k−1]L,t[k−1]U
γ
(k)L
i (9)
s.t. s(v)Li z
(v)
i + t
(v)L
i ≤ σ(z(v)i ) ≤ s(v)Ui z(v)i + t(v)Ui ,
∀ z(v)i ∈ [l(v)i ,u(v)i ], i ∈ [nv], v ∈ [k − 1],
and
min
s[k−1]L,s[k−1]U ,t[k−1]L,t[k−1]U
γ
(k)U
i (10)
s.t. s(v)Li z
(v)
i + t
(v)L
i ≤ σ(z(v)i ) ≤ s(v)Ui z(v)i + t(v)Ui ,
∀ z(v)i ∈ [l(v)i ,u(v)i ], i ∈ [nv], v ∈ [k − 1].
However, we stress that Problems (9) and (10) are gener-
ally non-convex optimization problems when there are more
than two layers in the target network. We enclose the proof
as Section A.7 in the appendix. Therefore, optimizing for
a non-convex objective function over parameters in large
search spaces with infinite number of constraints is imprac-
tical. To this end, our ideas are to limit the search space to
Table 2: Search space of bounding lines for ReLU, Sigmoid, and Tanh functions. “Variable” is the optimization variable that
characterizes the bounding line. “Range” is the feasible region of the variable. “-” indicates the case when the tightest bounding
line is unique and chosen. The slope and intercept of ReLU upper-bounding line are always set to be s0 and t(s0, l), respectively.
Nonlinearity ReLU (Lower bnd.) Sigmoid & Tanh (Upper bnd.) Sigmoid & Tanh (Lower bnd.)
Pre-activation
l < u ≤ 0 l < 0 < u 0 ≤ l < u l < u ≤ 0 l < 0 < u 0 ≤ l < u l < u ≤ 0 l < 0 < u 0 ≤ l < uBounds case 1 case 2 case 3 case 4
Variable - s - - d1 - d1 d2 d2 - -
Range - [0, 1] - - [ld, u] - [l, u] [l, u] [l, ud] - -
Slope s0 s s0 s0 σ′(d1) s0 σ′(d1) σ′(d2) σ′(d2) s0 s0
Intercept t(s0, l) 0 t(s0, l) t(s0, l) t(σ′(d1), d1) t(s0, l) t(σ′(d1), d1) t(σ′(d2), d2) t(σ′(d2), d2) t(s0, l) t(s0, l)
Notes: Case 1 refers to σ′(u)l + t(σ′(u), u) ≥ σ(l); and case 2, otherwise. Case 3 refers to σ′(l)u+ t(σ′(l), l) ≤ σ(u); and case 4, otherwise. s0 = [σ(u)− σ(l)]/
(u− l), t(s, y) = σ(y)− sy. ld and ud are defined as the abscissas of the points at which the tangent passes the left endpoint (l, σ(l)) and the right endpoint (u, σ(u)),
respectively. d1 and d2 are the abscissas of the points of tangency. See Figure 2 for the visualization of ld, ud, d1 and d2.
(a) 0 ≤ l < u (b) l < 0 < u
(c) l < u ≤ 0 (d) l < 0 < u
Figure 2: Illustration of the search space of bounding
lines for Sigmoid and ReLU activation. See definitions of
d1, d2, ud, ld in Table 2.
smaller ones. We present our solutions by first introducing
the ideas of “tighter” bounding lines.
Definition 1 Suppose h˜(k)Li (z
(k)
i ) = s˜
(k)L
i z
(k)
i + t˜
(k)L
i and
hˆ
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ) = sˆ
(k)L
i z
(k)
i + tˆ
(k)L
i are two lower-bounding
lines that satisfy{
h˜
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ) > hˆ
(k)L
i (z
(k)
i ), ∀ z(k)i ∈ (l(k)i ,u(k)i )
σ(z
(k)
i ) ≥ h˜(k)Li (z(k)i ), ∀ z(k)i ∈ [l(k)i ,u(k)i ]
then we say h˜(k)Li (z
(k)
i ) = s˜
(k)L
i z
(k)
i + t˜
(k)L
i is a tighter
lower-bounding line than hˆ(k)Li (z
(k)
i ) = sˆ
(k)L
i z
(k)
i + tˆ
(k)L
i
for the nonlinear activation σ in the interval [l(k)i ,u
(k)
i ].
Similarly, we define a tighter upper-bounding line. Accord-
ingly, the tightest bounding line refers to the hˆ(k)Li when
there is, by definition, no tighter bounding line than itself.
Note that the tightest bounding line may not be unique. For
example, any line passing through the origin with a slope be-
tween 0 and 1 is a tightest lower-bounding line for the ReLU
activation in an interval across the origin (l(v)i < 0 < u
(v)
i ).
With the notion of tightness, a straightforward idea is to
adopt one of the tightest bounding lines in every layer for
generally tighter closed-form pre-activation/output bounds.
However, the proposition:
tighter bounding lines⇒ tighter closed-form bounds
is not always true. We observe tighter bounding lines can
sometimes lead to looser bounds. However, if we roll back
to Condition 1, we can prove that it constitutes a sufficient
condition for the proposition.
Theorem 2 If the robustness of a neural net-
work is evaluated by CROWN on two trials with
two different sets of bounding lines character-
ized by {s˜[k−1]U , s˜[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L} and
{sˆ[k−1]U , sˆ[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L}, and in both of which
the self-consistency condition is met, then the closed-form
bounds obtained via CROWN satisfy
γ
(k)L
i (s˜
[k−1]U , s˜[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L) ≥
γ
(k)L
i (sˆ
[k−1]U , sˆ[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L),
γ
(k)U
i (s˜
[k−1]U , s˜[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L) ≤
γ
(k)U
i (sˆ
[k−1]U , sˆ[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L),
for ∀ i ∈ [nk], when bounding lines determined
by {s˜[k−1]U , s˜[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L} are the same as
or tighter than those determined by {sˆ[k−1]U , sˆ[k−1]L,
tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L}.
Proof: The self-consistency guarantees the optimality of
bounds given by CROWN to the corresponding LP prob-
lem (5) according to Theorem 1. As the use of tighter bound-
ing lines in Problem (5) narrows the feasible set, the optimal
value of Problem (5) (lower pre-activation/output bound)
will stay or grow larger, which means the lower bound given
by CROWN will stay or grow larger. Similar arguments ex-
tend to tightened upper bounds. 
Till now, we have confirmed the connection between
the tightest bounding lines and the tightest CROWN pre-
activation/output bound under Condition 1. In addition, we
manage to prove Theorem 2 under a weaker condition (see
its proof in Section A.6 in the appendix).
Condition 1 is too strong a condition for our proposed op-
timization framework to be practical. Actually we propose
to improve CROWN by breaking Condition 1. Our prob-
lem can be eased by only considering the dependency of
closed-form pre-activation/output bounds on the intercepts
(with the slopes fixed). We provide the following theorem:
Theorem 3 If the robustness of a neural network is eval-
uated by CROWN on two trials with bounding lines
characterized by {s[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L} and
{s[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L}, then the closed-form
bounds obtained via CROWN satisfy
γ
(k)L
i (s
[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L) ≥
γ
(k)L
i (s
[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L),
γ
(k)U
i (s
[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, t˜[k−1]U , t˜[k−1]L) ≤
γ
(k)U
i (s
[k−1]U , s[k−1]L, tˆ[k−1]U , tˆ[k−1]L),
for ∀ i ∈ [nk], when t˜(v−1)L < tˆ(v−1)L and t˜(v−1)U 4
tˆ(v−1)U , ∀v ∈ [k − 1].
This theoretical guarantee limits the freedom in choosing the
intercepts: we should always choose upper-bounding lines
with smaller intercepts and lower-bounding lines with larger
intercepts if different bounding lines are allowed for differ-
ent network neurons. Note that this conclusion holds under
no assumptions on the choice of bounding lines and hence
can be used to instruct how to choose bounding lines in
FROWN. We demonstrate Theorem 3 can be used to reduce
the search space of the upper (or lower) bounding line to
one that can be characterized by a single variable continu-
ously in Appendix Section A.8. This enables the usage of
gradient-based method to search over candidate bounding
lines to obtain tighter bounds. We further limit the search
space to the tightest bounding lines (which is a subset of
the search space narrowed only by Theorem 3) as demon-
strated in Table 2 and exemplified in Figure 2 in order to
simplify implementation. We emphasize that this limit is not
necessary. FROWN can be readily generalized to the case
in which the search space is reduced only by Theorem 3,
and the obtained bounds should be even tighter as the search
space is larger. Since the tightest bounding lines defined in
Table 2 automatically satisfy the optimization constraints in
Problems (9) and (10), the constrained optimization prob-
lems are then converted to unconstrained ones. Furthermore,
notice that the objective functions in the two problems are
differentiable to bounding line parameters. This allows us to
solve the problems by projected gradient descent (Nesterov
2014) (see details in Appendix Section A.9).
By and large, given an m-layer network F , input sample
x0 ∈ Rn, lp ball parameters p ≥ 1, and  ≥ 0, for ∀ j ∈
[nm], 1/q = 1 − 1/p, we can compute two fixed values
γLj and γ
U
j such that ∀x ∈ Bp(x0, ), the inequality γLj ≤
Fj(x) ≤ γUj holds. Suppose the label of the input sequence
is i, the largest possible lower bound i of untargeted and
targeted (target class j) attacks is found by solving:
Untargeted: i = max

, s.t. γLi () ≥ γUj (), ∀j 6= i.
Targeted: ˆ(i, j) = max

, s.t. γLi () ≥ γUj ().
We conduct binary search procedures to compute the largest
possible i (or ˆ).
Experimental Results
Overview. In this section, we aim at comparing the LP-
based method5 and FROWN as two approaches to improve
CROWN. We allow the LP-based method to use more than
one bounding lines (which also increases computation cost)
in order to make improvement on CROWN. Specifically,
two lower-bounding lines are considered for ReLU networks
while up to three upper/lower-bounding lines are adopted for
Sigmoid (or Tanh) networks in the LP-based method (more
details supplemented as Section A.4 in the appendix). On
the other hand, FROWN improves CROWN solutions by
optimizing over the bounding lines to give tighter bounds.
These two approaches are evaluated and compared herein
by both the safeguarded regions they certify and their time
complexity. We run the LP-based method on a single Intel
Xeon E5-2640 v3 (2.60GHz) CPU. We implement our pro-
posed method FROWN using PyTorch to enable the use of
an NVIDIA GeForce GTX TITAN X GPU. However, we
time FROWN on a single Intel Xeon E5-2640 v3 (2.60GHz)
CPU when comparing with the LP-based method for fair
comparisons. We leave the detailed experimental set-ups and
complete experimental results to Appendix Section A.9.
Experiment I. In the first experiment, we compare the
improvements of FROWN and the LP-based method over
CROWN on sensorless drive diagnosis networks 6 and
MNIST classifiers. We present their results in Table 3. As
shown in the table, we consider ReLU and Sigmoid (results
of Tanh networks are included in Appendix Section A.9) net-
works that are trained independently on two datasets. The
size of the networks ranges from 3 layers to 20 layers and 20
neurons to 100 neurons. We remark that even on networks
with only 100 neurons, the LP-based method scales badly
and is unable to provide results in 100 minutes for only one
image. The improved bounds in Table 3 verify the effective-
ness of both FROWN and LP-based approach in tightening
CROWN results. Specifically, an up to 93% improvement
in the magnitude of bounds is witnessed on sensorless drive
diagnosis networks. And in general, the deeper the target
network is, the greater improvement can be achieved. When
comparing FROWN to the LP-based method, it is demon-
strated that FROWN computes bounds up to two orders of
magnitudes faster than the LP-based method and is espe-
cially advantageous when certifying l1-norm regions. On the
other hand, while the LP-based method gives larger certified
bounds for ReLU networks in most cases, FROWN certifies
larger bounds for Sigmoid and Tanh networks.
Experiment II. In our second experiment, we compute the
robustness certificate on CIFAR10 networks that have 2048
neurons in each layer. With the width of neural networks, the
LP-based method is unusable due to its high computational-
complexity. Therefore, we only show the improvements
FROWN has brought to the original CROWN solutions. In
5The highly-efficient Gurobi LP solver is adopted here.
6https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Dataset+for+
Sensorless+Drive+Diagnosis
Table 3: (Experiment I) Averaged certified l∞ bounds and lp bounds (p = 1, 2,∞) of Sensorless Drive Diagnosis classifiers
and MNIST classifiers, respectively. ”N/A” indicates no results can be obtained in the given runtime. The up arrow “↑” means
“ more than”. “m× [N ] σ” means an m-layer network with N neurons and σ activation.
Sensorless Drive Diagnosis classifiers
Network p Certified Bounds Improvement Avg. Time per Image (s) Speedups ofCROWN FROWN LP FROWN LP FROWN LP FROWN over LP
4× [20] ReLU
∞
0.2019 0.2247 0.2269 11.27% 12.38% 0.35 0.96 2.8X
8× [20] ReLU 0.2094 0.2365 0.2526 12.95% 20.66% 1.81 4.19 2.3X
12× [20] ReLU 0.1996 0.2496 0.2740 25.05% 37.28% 4.39 9.46 2.2X
4× [20] Sigmoid
∞
0.1019 0.1418 0.1388 39.08% 36.21% 0.74 2.11 2.8X
8× [20] Sigmoid 0.0858 0.1618 0.1626 88.62% 89.59% 4.15 32.15 7.7X
12× [20] Sigmoid 0.0782 0.1510 0.1081 93.06% 38.22% 8.71 152.91 17.6X
MNIST classifiers
5× [20]
ReLU
1 3.8018 4.0835 4.2215 7.41% 11.04% 1.69 195.07 115.5X
2 0.5346 0.5710 0.5587 6.81% 4.52% 1.12 41.63 37.1X
∞ 0.0261 0.0278 0.0287 6.52% 9.89% 1.26 11.93 9.5X
20× [20]
ReLU
1 2.3853 3.1062 3.1735 30.22% 33.04% 35.53 1301.11 36.6X
2 0.3656 0.4925 0.5074 34.71% 38.78% 31.10 229.87 7.4X
∞ 0.0183 0.0240 0.0245 30.84% 33.75% 43.31 199.40 4.6X
5× [20]
Sigmoid
1 1.8009 2.1340 2.1126 18.49% 17.31% 1.75 310.27 177.2X
2 0.3100 0.3581 0.3417 15.51% 10.20% 1.23 44.00 35.9X
∞ 0.0153 0.0174 0.0170 13.94% 11.11% 1.39 17.19 12.4X
20× [20]
Sigmoid
1 1.5348 1.9779 1.9730 28.87% 28.55% 31.80 4904.99 154.3X
2 0.2524 0.3261 0.2657 29.21% 5.28% 31.77 1354.54 42.6X
∞ 0.0131 0.0166 0.0153 27.01% 17.12% 44.86 1859.68 41.5X
5× [100]
ReLU
1 3.8928 4.2343 N/A 8.77% N/A 13.11 6000.00↑ 457.8X↑
2 0.5499 0.5789 0.5934 5.28% 7.91% 10.90 826.79 75.9X
∞ 0.0261 0.0276 0.0278 5.85% 6.57% 10.42 446.07 42.8X
7× [100]
ReLU
1 3.5509 3.9907 N/A 12.38% N/A 55.07 10000.00↑ 181.6X↑
2 0.4997 0.5347 N/A 7.01% N/A 49.49 10000.00↑ 202.1X↑
∞ 0.0241 0.0258 N/A 7.09% N/A 44.94 10000.00↑ 222.5X↑
5× [100]
Sigmoid
1 2.0998 2.5184 N/A 19.93% N/A 13.64 10000.00↑ 733.0X↑
2 0.3233 0.3774 0.2494 16.74% −22.84% 12.38 9368.58 757.1X
∞ 0.0156 0.0186 0.0177 18.76% 13.10% 13.09 1319.25 100.8X
7× [100]
Sigmoid
1 1.7294 2.2380 N/A 29.40% N/A 48.96 10000.00↑ 204.3X↑
2 0.2833 0.3427 N/A 20.96% N/A 42.04 10000.00↑ 237.9X↑
∞ 0.0140 0.0168 N/A 19.96% N/A 42.00 10000.00↑ 238.1X↑
Table 4: (Experiment II) Averaged certified lp bounds of different classifiers on CIFAR10 Networks.
Network p Certified Bounds Improve- Network p Certified Bounds Improve- Network p Certified Bounds Improve-CROWN FROWN ment CROWN FROWN ment CROWN FROWN ment
4× [2048]
ReLU
1 7.5460 7.5989 0.70%
6× [2048]
ReLU
1 4.5990 4.7241 2.72%
8× [2048]
ReLU
1 4.2349 4.9416 16.69%
2 0.6175 0.6303 2.09% 2 0.3745 0.3723 −0.60% 2 0.3476 0.3809 9.59%
∞ 0.0151 0.0157 4.14% ∞ 0.0092 0.0093 0.95% ∞ 0.0087 0.0094 8.83%
4× [2048]
Sigmoid
1 3.6558 4.4726 22.34%
6× [2048]
Sigmoid
1 1.5093 1.8430 22.11%
8× [2048]
Sigmoid
1 1.2875 1.6862 30.97%
2 0.2847 0.3353 17.77% 2 0.1180 0.1448 22.71% 2 0.1006 0.1295 28.65%
∞ 0.0069 0.0082 18.33% ∞ 0.0029 0.0035 21.03% ∞ 0.0024 0.0033 37.65%
this experiment, we further speed up FROWN by optimizing
neurons in a layer group by group, instead of one by one,
and we provide a parameter to balance the trade-off between
tightness of bounds and time cost in FROWN(see details in
Appendix Section A.10). We observe consistent trends on
CIFAR10 networks: the deeper the neural network is, the
more significant improvement can be made by FROWN in
tightening CROWN solutions. Notably, an up to 38% im-
provement in certified bounds is achieved when considering
l∞-norm balls in Sigmoid networks.
Discussion
Overall, we have shown the trade-off between the computa-
tional costs and certified adversarial distortions in ReLU net-
works: the LP-based approach certifies larger bounds than
FROWN at the cost of 2 to 178 times longer runtime. How-
ever, the LP-based approach suffers poor scalability and
soon becomes computationally infeasible as the network
grows deeper or wider. In contrast, FROWN manages to in-
crease the certified region of CROWN much more efficiently
and wins over the LP-based approach in almost all Sig-
moid/Tanh networks. Notably, in some cases, the LP-based
method gives even worse result than CROWN (those with
negative improvements). We conclude two possible reasons:
i) the Gurobi LP solver is not guaranteed to converge to
the optimal solution and ii) statistical fluctuations caused by
random sample selections. More discussions on this are in-
cluded in Appendix Section A.9.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proved the optimality of CROWN in
the relaxed LP framework under mild conditions. Further-
more, we have proposed a general and versatile optimization
framework named FROWN for optimizing state-of-the-art
formal robustness verifiers including CROWN, CNN-Cert,
and POPQORN. Experiments on various networks have ver-
ified the usefulness of FROWN in providing tightened ro-
bustness certificates at a significantly lower cost than the
LP-based method.
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